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Europeanization should meet international constructivism:  
The Nordic Plus group and the internalization of political conditionality by 
France and the United Kingdom1 
DAMIANO DE FELICE 
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, United 
Kingdom 
 
ABSTRACT: This article is a plausibility probe for the significance of international constructivist ‘mediating 
factors’ to explain variation in Europeanization outcomes. The article applies a Most Similar Systems Design 
(or Mill’s Method of Difference) to show that the United Kingdom has internalized political conditionality to 
a larger extent than France at least partially because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures 
within the Nordic Plus Group. The articles contributes to the literature on Europeanization and development 
cooperation in two important ways. First, it enlarges its scope of analysis, both geographically (beyond new 
European Union Member States) and thematically (beyond simple measures of aid quality and/or quantity). 
Second, it emphasizes the importance of international (versus domestic) mediating factors. The empirical 
analysis focuses on three cases of aid sanctions in response to human rights abuses and democratic setbacks: 
Zimbabwe 2002, Madagascar 2009 and Mozambique 2009. 
KEY WORDS: conditionality, constructivism, Europeanization, human rights, internalization 
 
  
                                                 
1 An edited version of this article was published in European Politics and Society, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 58-73 
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23745118.2015.1075773).  
Introduction 
This article is a plausibility probe for the significance of international constructivist ‘mediating 
factors’ to explain variation in Europeanization outcomes. In particular, the article shows that the 
United Kingdom (UK) has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France at least 
partially because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures within the Nordic Plus 
Group (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, UK and Sweden). Political 
conditionality is defined as the norm by which aid donors should make the allocation and 
disbursement of development assistance dependent on respect for fundamental human rights and 
basic democratic principles by recipient governments. 
The article concentrates on France and the UK because, notwithstanding their similar status in 
world politics (as Member States of the EU, big donors, former colonial empires, nuclear powers 
and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), and notwithstanding a formal 
attempt to coordinate their development policies in Africa (sanctioned by a joint declaration at 
Saint-Malo in 1998) (Chafer and Cumming 2010a), the two countries have adopted starkly different 
approaches to the application of aid sanctions. This situation offers a unique vantage point to test 
potential intervening variables that can explain the different attitude towards political conditionality 
by influential EU Member States. The Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill’s Method of 
Difference) suggests to compare cases which are as similar as possible, except with regard to the 
dependent variable. The ambition is to keep constant the highest possible number of independent 
variables (Anckar 2008; Yin 2009, 64–67). 
The article contributes to the academic literature on Europeanization and development cooperation 
in two important ways. First, it enlarges its scope of analysis. Even if recent works have pointed at 
the limited but discernible role played by the European Commission in coordinating Member 
States’ development practices (Carbone 2007; Carbone 2010; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012; Orbie 
2012), research on the Europeanization of development cooperation has been very limited so far. Its 
foundations are sketched in only two book chapters (Bretherton 2013; Orbie and Lightfoot 2014). 
Moreover, researchers have produced only a few empirical studies, limited geographically to new 
Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, and thematically to aspects such as aid quantity, 
regional focus, tied aid and use of budget support (Horký 2012; Lightfoot 2010; Lightfoot and 
Szent-Iványi 2014; Vittek and Lightfoot 2009). This article is the first study ever to deal with the 
Europeanisation of the development cooperation of EU Member States as old and powerful as 
France and the UK, and also to concentrate on the issue of political conditionality. In addition, even 
the most advanced papers so far have not dealt with variation between European donors. For 
instance, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi explained the similar ‘reluctance’ that several New Member 
States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have shown in approximating their 
ODA policies to the EU’s acquis communautaire in development policy since their accession. Their 
analysis is not intended to offer a comprehensive comparative study between these countries 
(Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014). 
Second, the article contributes to theorizing those elements that are capable to explain variation in 
Europeanization outcomes. Without opening the Pandora’s box of what Europeanisation is and 
what it is not (for a useful primer, see J. P. Olsen 2002), researchers interested in Europeanization 
processes have concentrated not only on the impact of the EU on its Member States, but also on the 
transfer of politics, policies and policy making between EU Member States (Bache 2006, 232). The 
academic literature on Europeanization has already explored a few key “mediating factors” that can 
help explain variation in the degree of domestic change adjusting to pressure from EU institutions 
and/or from other EU Member States (Börzel 2005, 53; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 11). 
From a rational choice perspective, Europeanisation is facilitated by the absence of multiple veto 
players and the existence of mediating formal institutions (see, for instance, Haverland 2000). From 
a sociological perspective, Europeanisation is assisted by normative resonance with domestic 
understandings, strong norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented decision-making cultures (see, 
for instance, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014, 16).  
Against this background, it is rather surprising that little attention has been dedicated to the role of 
international pressure from other groups or sub-groups of states, within and outside the European 
Union. For instance, when Swedish and Dutch update their policies, it is plausible that Denmark 
will find itself under higher pressure than Italy to change its policies too. If Spain changes its 
behaviour following stimulus from the European Commission, pressure to conform is expected to 
be higher for Portugal than for Estonia. 
The article is structured as follows. The second section compares the two donors on the basis of (1) 
endorsement of political conditionality in policy documents, and (2) willingness to adopt aid 
sanctions in response to human rights violations or democratic setbacks. The section shows that the 
UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France. The third section clarifies 
the international constructivist hypothesis. The main idea is that variation between France and the 
UK can be at least partially explained by reference to the fact that the two donors belong to different 
groups of states which do not assign the same level of importance to political conditionality. The 
last section tests this hypothesis against empirical evidence.  
In order to test the hypothesis, information from primary sources (such as independent newspapers’ 
articles, government evaluation reports and diplomatic cables) is triangulated with semi-structured 
interviews with more than 100 individuals. These individuals were selected because of current or 
past working experience with French and British institutions, other donors and/or development and 
human rights NGOs. The empirical analysis mainly focuses on three cases of aid sanctions: 
Zimbabwe 2002, Madagascar 2009 and Mozambique 2009. These countries include a former 
British colony, a former French colony, and one of the few countries in the world where the two 
donors have similar influence and interests. 
Before proceeding, it is important to specify that this article is a not an Europeanisation study per 
se. The article compares France and the UK one against the other, without systematically exploring 
all mechanisms and processes through which European institutions and other EU Member States 
may have influenced the evolution of French and British development programmes. Yet, the article 
builds on another study that did take into full account other important elements, such as the 
influence of realist considerations and domestic politics (de Felice 2015). 
In this light, the article represents a ‘plausibility probe’, not a fully-fledged test, of the relevance 
and validity of a new international constructivist hypothesis in the context of Europeanization 
research (on plausibility probes, see George and Bennett 2005, 75; Levy 2008, 5; for an example, 
see Heupel and Zangl 2010). This exercise is important because the emphasis of much previous 
analysis ‘has been on the presentation of empirical results as evidence for Europeanization rather 
than on systematic theory building’ (de Flers and Müller 2012, 24). 
 
Variation between France and the UK in the internalization of political conditionality 
Policies 
French policy-makers do not support the idea that allocation and disbursement of development 
assistance should strictly depend on respect for fundamental human rights and basic democratic 
principles by recipient governments. In 2006, the French Inter-ministerial Committee on 
International Cooperation and Development (Comité Interministériel pour la Coopération 
Internationale et le Développement, CICID) – that is, the body in charge of signalling the direction 
of French aid – adopted a white paper titled “Governance strategy for French Development 
Assistance”. According to the document, ‘the quality of cooperation should not be measured so 
much by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through 
conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specific experience 
and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies’ (French Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs 2006, 16).  
Interestingly, political conditionality is not considered appropriate even for budget support 
operations, albeit this aid modality is unanimously recognized to be increasingly subject to the 
application of aid sanctions (Hayman 2011; Molenaers 2012). French budget support is dispensed 
on the basis of two documents: a “Doctrine for the use of comprehensive budgetary aid in foreign 
States” adopted by CICID in February 2007, and a “Strategy of operational implementation” laid 
down by in March 2007. Three eligibility conditions have to be satisfied for the planning and 
disbursement of budget support:  
1. a sound and sustainable macroeconomic policy;  
2. a growth and poverty-reduction strategy in line with Millennium Development Goals; and  
3. a favourable assessment of the public financial management system (CICID 2007). 
As can be seen, no human rights requirement is included.  
The different with London is evident. The UK presents a firm stance in favour of political 
conditionality. In March 2005, the UK Department for International Development (DfID), Her 
Majesty’s Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) jointly adopted a document 
titled “Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality”, which ‘sets out the 
circumstances in which [the UK] will consider modifying or withdrawing existing aid 
commitments’ (DfID 2005, 4). The UK government clearly affirms that ‘an effective aid 
partnership should be based on a shared commitment to three objectives: 
1. reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals; 
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; and 
3. strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk of funds being 
misused through weak administration or corruption’ (DfID 2005, 1, 8). 
DFID, the Treasury and the FCO clearly state that ‘the UK will consider reducing or interrupting 
aid if: 
 countries veer significantly away from agreed poverty reduction objectives or outcomes or 
the agreed objectives of a particular aid commitment (e.g. through an unjustifiable rise in 
military spending, or a substantial deviation from the agreed poverty reduction programme); 
or 
 countries are in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations; or 
 there is a significant breakdown in partner government financial management and 
accountability, leading to the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or 
corruption’ (DfID 2005, 3, 9). 
Since 2005, this conditionality policy has been reaffirmed numerous times (including with respect 
to budget support operations), even by the new Coalition government. In July 2011, DFID 
published a “Technical Note on Implementing DFID’s strengthened approach to budget support”, 
which affirms that, in considering whether to give budget support or not, it will continue to assess 
governments against the three commitments mentioned above. In addition, it ‘will place more 
emphasis on domestic accountability by making partner country commitment to strengthening 
domestic accountability a specific commitment, separating it out from the other commitments, so 
the commitments will be to: 
1. poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals; 
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; 
3. improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency and 
fighting corruption; and 
4. strengthening domestic accountability’ (DfID 2011, 1). 
Behaviour 
Academic researchers have recurrently suggested that that, at least since the end of the Cold War, 
France has been less willing than the UK to apply political conditionality. For example, Uvin found 
that, in comparison with other major donors, ‘the French policy towards political conditionality is 
much more modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent support for the 
prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic or human rights record’ (Uvin 
1993, 66). Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French and British aid from the end of 
the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was ‘a radical shift with the introduction of political 
conditionality’. While the shift has gradually been watered down in both countries, this happened 
more in France, and ‘to a lesser extent’ in the UK (Cumming 2001, 340).  
More recent anecdotic evidence consistently supports this view. After the 2009 coup in 
Madagascar, France was the only Western donor with operations in the country (in contrast with the 
EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to continue some bilateral government-to-government 
programmes (Connolly 2013, 6; Dewar, Massey, and Baker 2013, 13; Vivier 2010, 162). During the 
2009 donor strike in Mozambique, France adopted a soft stance and avoided a confrontational 
position against the Mozambican government (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique 2010b). The 
UK was among the leaders of the strike and one of the most vocal critics of the political situation 
(Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique 2010a; Wikileaks 2009). When the Zimbabwean 
government resorted to widespread human rights abuses in connection with its fast-track land 
reform at the beginning of the 2000s, the UK pushed for the adoption of aid sanctions (Addison and 
Laakso 2003, 468; International Crisis Group 2002, 15; Taylor and Williams 2002, 556). In contrast 
with the British position, France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors 
(Chafer 2002, 351; Cilliers 2001, 124; Grebe 2010, 125). 
A significant difference between France and the UK is also confirmed by statistical studies that 
have investigated whether the human rights performance of potential recipient governments have 
influenced the decisions of bilateral donors on (a) who their recipient governments should be and 
(b) how much aid these governments should receive. The large majority of analyses show that 
human rights and democracy variables have little influence on French aid allocation patterns, and in 
any case lower influence than on British aid allocation. For instance, Alesina and Dollar found that 
‘the strongest positive response to democratic institutions is for the U.S., the Dutch, the U.K., the 
Nordics, and Canada. Of the major donors, France is the one that seems to pay no attention to the 
democracy of the receiving country’ (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 49). According to Hoeffler and 
Outram, ‘most bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit ... The UK and 
Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy 
scores, and fewer human rights abuses’ (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 237; see also Berthélemy 2006; 
Neumayer 2003; the only exception is Carey 2007). 
 
International constructivism: the hypothesis 
In contrast with the domestic focus of both rationalist and sociological “mediating factors” 
suggested by Europeanization researchers so far, international constructivism concentrates on the 
foreign dimension. The main argument is that states’ behaviour is heavily influenced by the (active 
as well as involuntary) ideational and social pressures exercised by other international actors 
(mainly states, international organisations and transnational movements) (Wendt 1999).2 The 
behaviour of states is norm-driven (not goal-oriented), and norms are constructed (as well as 
deconstructed) through social interaction at the international level (Ruggie 1998). As highlighted by 
Brysk, foreign policy can be ‘constructed outward. The identities that shape interests are 
constructed in relation to others’ (Brysk 2009, 33). Finnemore and Sikkink best exemplified this 
approach through a model of norms’ cascade. Once a critical mass of states adopt an international 
norm, ‘states and state élites fashion a political self or identity in relation to the international 
community’, and seek ‘legitimation, conformity and esteem’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902–3)  
On the basis of these insights, international constructivist scholars explain similarities and 
differences between foreign policies through social processes at the international level: foreign 
policies are similar when states construct their identities (and therefore adopt the norms dictated by 
                                                 
2 I call this approach ‘international’ constructivism in order to distinguish it from ‘unit-level’ constructivism, whose 
focus lies on the relationship between local/domestic norms and the identities, interests and actions of states (Reus–Smit 
2002). 
these identities) together with each other; foreign policies are dissimilar when states construct their 
identities without, or even against, each other (Checkel 1999; Finnemore 1993). For example, 
Rittberger suggests that norms ‘emerge in, and are restricted in their validity to, particular regional 
contexts, producing cross-regional variation in state behaviour’ (Rittberger 2004, 25).  
Importantly, even though international constructivism stresses the influence of social pressures at 
the international level, a distinctive characteristic of this approach is its agnosticism over which 
social pressures matter most in influencing a specific state’s identities, norms and actions. This is a 
question for empirical research (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001, 110).  
A potential explanation for variation in the extent of Europeanization of political conditionality by 
France and the UK is therefore that the two donors belong to different groups of states, inside 
and/or outside the EU. The hypothesis that will be considered in this article revolves around 
participation in the Nordic Plus Group (which includes the UK but not France).  
At the beginning of the 2000s, the four Nordic donors (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
plus Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK formally joined forces under the heading of the ‘Nordic 
Plus Group’. Since then, the groups has gained in importance. In 2006, Selbervik and Nygaard 
argued that ‘the Nordic Plus group appears as a more important point of reference than the Nordic 
countries per se’ (Selbervik and Nygaard 2006, 51). 
A constructivist explanation has strong plausibility in the field on foreign aid and human rights 
promotion. Several scholars have already explained the diffusion of development cooperation 
programmes by the force of ideational and social processes (Lumsdaine 1993; Riddell 1987). Even 
specifically on political conditionality, researchers reported the emergence on ‘common features’ in 
the methodology of country-level human rights assessments evaluation (D’Hollander, Marx, and 
Wouters 2014, 236). Del Biondo and Orbie reported that, in the case of Ethiopia, coordination after 
the 2005 human rights violations was driven by ‘peer pressure and the hope of having some effect 
through coordinated action’ (Del Biondo and Orbie 2014, 422). 
 International constructivism: the plausibility probe 
The hypothesis that the UK has been at least partially ‘socialized’ into political conditionality 
through participation in the Nordic Plus Group faces a two-step test:  
1. Nordic countries should have internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than 
other EU Member States;  
2. The UK should have been more amenable than France to social pressure from the Nordic 
group. 
Regarding the first point, there is little doubt that the group of Nordic donors have always set the 
highest standards in terms of value-based development policies, including the integration of human 
rights into development programmes and the adoption of aid sanctions against repressive regimes 
(Stokke 2005, 41). According to Selbervik and Nyggard, the Nordic countries ‘were among the 
pioneers in linking development aid and human rights’ (Selbervik and Nygaard 2006, 26). 
Employing a dataset covering the period 1980 to 1999 and as many as 91 recipient countries, Gates 
and Hoeffler found that ‘unlike the average donor, Nordic donors allocate aid according to 
democracy and human rights records but not to political allies’ (Gates and Hoeffler 2004, 11). 
The analysis of specific cases of aid sanctions confirm that Nordic countries are very often among 
the hardliners against repressive regimes. Sweden strongly argued in favour of aid sanctions against 
Mugabe at the beginning of the 2000s (Laakso 2002, 450; G. R. Olsen 2011, 99). Norway 
immediately suspended development cooperation after Rajoelina toppled Ravalomanana in 
Madagascar (Lough 2009). Denmark and the Netherlands have always been among the strongest 
supporters of sanctions against the Burmese regime (Egreteau 2010, 28). Sweden was among the 
hardliners after the 2005 elections in Ethiopia (diplomat in Addis-Ababa, 10 September 2014). 
Regarding the second point, almost all interviewees validated the hypothesis that Nordic countries 
put lower social pressure on France than on Britain. Chafer and Cumming suggested that ‘France is 
never happy to copy others, it takes inspiration and then adapts itself’ (Chafer and Cumming 2010b, 
59). A former diplomat in numerous African countries confirmed the general unwillingness of 
France to coordinate and, above all, to ‘be coordinated’, which can be equated to ‘be persuaded’ 
(former diplomat in Harare, 26 April 2013). When asked about French development cooperation in 
their countries of competence, almost all development officers from Nordic countries confessed that 
they know very little about the programmes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AFD 
(diplomat in Harare, 9 September 2014; diplomat in Mozambique, 26 August 2014). A diplomat in 
Antananarivo shared his surprise when the new French Ambassador in Madagascar, who arrived in 
the middle of the political crisis, showed no interest in knowing what other local diplomats thought 
about the crisis and how they would have reacted to the unilateral French decision to continue 
development assistance to Rajoelina (foreign diplomat in Antananarivo, 16 September 2014).  
Loose cooperation between France and Nordic countries is confirmed by the Donor Atlas published 
by the European Commission and the OECD in 2006. At that time, nine donors (including 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) claimed that their coordination 
with other EU Member States was ‘strong’. Italy, Portugal and Greece reported weak coordination, 
while France and Spain failed to respond to the question altogether (Development Strategies 2006). 
When these results were pointed at a Nordic diplomat commented: ‘You can see by yourself who 
coordinates more and who coordinates less among Member States’ (diplomat in Antananarivo, 1 
September 2014). 
Lack of persuasion through close coordination is accompanied by limited chances for imitation. The 
French diplomats who have been interviewed did not demonstrate any deference to the Nordic 
approach. They talked about the Nordic Plus donors as ‘a group of donors who believe they are the 
best in class’ (emphasis added, diplomat in Paris, 6 September 2014). Even when they acknowledge 
that Nordic donors score better than anybody else in most aid quality rankings (Knack, Rogers, and 
Eubank 2011), they differentiate France on the basis of the argument that ‘we are a much greater 
power, with larger interests. In the end, the only interest of Nordic countries is to be at the top of 
these rankings. It is not a fair comparison’ (diplomat in Paris, 21 March 2014).  
Institutional differences further limit the possibility of imitation. French officials often argue that 
‘AFD is not a development agency like Sida and Norad’ (AFD senior manager in Paris, 25 March 
2013). According to Naudet, this attitude may also derive from scepticism regarding international 
norms. The priorities of French aid ‘have been somewhat removed from the constantly changing 
international priorities ... there is a widespread feeling of mistrust within the French system with 
regard to the new priorities ... these are sometimes considered as ‘fashions’ which are likely to falter 
or disappear as new ideas emerge’ (Naudet 1997, 177). 
As far as the UK is concerned, almost all interviewees emphasized a good level of harmonization 
with Nordic countries. To start with, there is high resonance in terms of values and principles. A 
UK diplomat highlighted that, ‘even though the UK and the Nordics might disagree on the 
appropriate response to specific abuses, I always trust them to share our own values and objectives. 
This is why I pay attention to what they say’ (former diplomat in Rangoon, 10 September 2014). A 
Nordic diplomat confessed that ‘sometimes we are worried by the way in which a large organisation 
like DfID works, and I can give you examples of situations when we thought that it operated too 
close with the government. However, I have never questioned their values. In that respect, we are 
very similar’ (diplomat in Addis Ababa, 10 September 2014).  
According to a DfID official, similar values are not the only feature that makes UK-Nordic 
harmonization easy. 
Between UK and Nordics, not only is there agreement on the principles of development 
programmes, there are also frequent high level meetings between the heads of the development 
aid departments from the countries involved. There are joint visits to countries receiving aid 
from Britain and the Nordics as well as joint programming in these countries (DfID senior 
manager in London, 19 May 2014). 
In terms of joint programming and coordination, the Nordic Plus group takes centre stage. The 
group actively promotes the ‘Joint Action Plan of Effective Aid Delivery through Harmonisation 
and Alignment of Donor Practices’, and has mainly concentrated on aid coordination and delegated 
cooperation (“Nordic Plus Launches Ambitious Goals for Harmonisation” 2006; for an example in 
Zambia, see OECD 2004, 69). However, the Group has also covered human rights and 
conditionality. Human rights were perceived as a natural element for cooperation among the 
countries. In 2006, the seven countries carried out a joint assessment of policies and administrative 
practices in order to identify possible barriers for delegated cooperation among the Nordic Plus 
partners. One of the main findings was that ‘certain cross-cutting issues and themes are common to 
all the donors. These include Governance (Human Rights and Democratisation)’ (COWI 2006, 23). 
The Nordic Plus Group also actively worked to harmonize (and thus reduce) the conditions in the 
programmes they supported (Development Finance International 2009, 6). 
Close coordination within the Nordic Plus group offers ample opportunities for both persuasion and 
imitation. As far as persuasion is concerned, Ingebritsen has already suggested that Scandinavian 
countries deliberately act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in foreign aid: they have ‘consistently and 
actively sought to influence more powerful states in establishing and strengthening global norms of 
cooperation’ (Ingebritsen 2002, 11).3 Herman spoke of the Netherlands as a gidsland, a ‘mentor 
state’ (Herman 2006, 863). Dahl categorized Sweden as a ‘moral superpower’, a country that sees 
‘itself as a natural role model in the international community’ and takes ‘it upon itself to act as a 
guide to other actors in the system’ (Dahl 2006, 897).  
The attempts of Nordic countries to persuade the UK to adopt joint sanctions make perfect sense 
from the perspective of small states (Thorhallsson 2000; Egeland 1984). Small states do not possess 
numerous sources of influence over large organisations like the EU. However, sometime they are 
able to punch above their weight. As recognized by Panke, ‘small states are neither per se political 
                                                 
3 Importantly, influence is reciprocal. For instance, Browning warns that the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Nordic ‘brand’ is 
being challenged, in particular because of the ‘medling of Nordic with European practices and processes’ (Browning 
2007). 
dwarfs nor power-brokers’ (Panke 2011, 137). Two recurrent mechanisms of influence help explain 
their behaviour in cases of political conditionality. First, small states often try to influence larger 
players by putting forward arguments that appeal to shared ideas, a strategy which Björkdahl 
referred to as ‘normative framing’ (Björkdahl 2007, 140). Second, small states need to cultivate 
‘network capital’ (Nasra 2011, 168). The UK is the ideal candidate for coalition-building with 
powerful actors on the basis of norms and values. 
As far as imitation is concerned, Lumsdaine has already argued that ‘some countries, such as the 
Dutch and the Swedes, … consciously see their role in the aid process as one of seeking to set 
higher standards, to reform and correct the aid process by example’ (Lumsdaine 1993, 66). A UK 
diplomat confirmed that ‘if human rights violations take place, if a coup is staged, it is very likely 
that one of the first diplomats I would contact would be a Nordic official’ (diplomat in Guinea, 11 
September 2014).  
Importantly, persuasion and emulation of Nordic countries have played an important role at all 
levels of political conditionality:  
1. the adoption of policies,  
2. the inclusion of human rights clauses in development agreements, and  
3. the application of aid sanctions.  
Policies. British adoption of advanced policy documents on political conditionality is linked to 
emulation of Nordic countries. Interviewees suggested that Nordic-UK synchronization goes back 
to the end of the 1990s, when the Ministers for Development Cooperation in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the UK (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Eveline Herfkens, Hilde Johnson 
and Clare Short respectively) were all women. Named the ‘Utstein Group’, and later enlarged to 
Canada and Sweden, this forum assumed a coordinating function and a proactive role in the 
international donor community (in particular on poverty reduction, anti-corruption and donor 
coherence) (Lawry-White 2003, 4). A former DfID official commented that, at the time of the 
creation of the Department, the affinity between Clare Short and the other Development Minister 
meant that the new-born British Department, eager to position itself as a leader in the development 
sector, recurrently looked at the policies of the Nordic countries to draw inspiration (DfID senior 
manager in London, 28 March 2014). 
International agreements. The UK found itself under pressure also to mainstream the inclusion of 
human rights provisions. The Joint Financing Arrangement promoted by the Nordic Plus Group 
explicitly include a human rights clause (Nordic Plus 2007, 11). The Nordic Plus Group also drafted 
a template for arrangements on delegated cooperation. This document reveals the important role 
played by other countries (in this case the Netherlands) in pressing for the inclusion of human rights 
clause: ‘The Programme Arrangement will be based on the principle of national ownership, and will 
cover at least the following issues: … if the Netherlands is Co-Donor: A provision on respect for 
human rights and adherence to democratic principles, rule of law and good governance’ (COWI 
2007, 36). 
Sanctions. Pressure from Nordic donors on British decisions was detected also before specific 
responses to human rights abuses. In Maputo, the main donor coordination group is the G19. 
However, smaller informal groups ‘are not a secret to anyone in Mozambique’. The EU is one of 
these groups, even though ‘EU coordination is weak’. The reason is that ‘it reproduces the 
European North/South distinction which is already present within the G19’ (diplomat in Maputo, 22 
August 2014). The more cohesive group is, again, the informal coordination among Nordic Plus (or 
‘like-minded’) countries. The four Scandinavian countries share the same building, and their 
coordination is therefore ‘logistically’ easy. However, they often reach out ‘similar agencies, like 
DfID’. This is perceived to be ‘spontaneous’ because ‘we share the same value’. The diplomat 
continued: 
It is true. The donors which participate in the Nordic Plus Group adopted a similar stance ... 
during the donor strike ... This is not surprising if you think that we consider ourselves to be 
obvious collaborators in numerous circumstances (diplomat in Maputo, 4 September 2014).4  
Evidence of Nordic Plus coordination on good governance and human rights issues can be found in 
other programmes as well. Shortly before 2011, the Nordic Plus donors launched an initiative to 
strengthen partnerships between donors and civil society organisations. The objective was ‘to 
establish a set of principles for donors to follow to increase civil society capacity at the local level, 
as well as to improve donor effectiveness and co-ordination between civil society organisations and 
Nordic Plus donors’ (Manning and Malbrough 2012, 14). A foreign diplomat reported that, in a 
rather unusual step for a highly coordinated environment like the Mozambican one, in March 2013 
Nordic Plus donors unilaterally (that is, without consultation with other Western donors) sent a 
letter to the Prime Minister asking for explanation about governance in the forestry sector (diplomat 
in Maputo, 26 August 2014). 
The absence of any ‘natural partnership’ between France and Nordic countries in the application of 
political conditionality is confirmed by researchers who have analysed other cases. In the 2009 
political crisis in Niger, France made it clear that it was very interested in maintaining Danish 
involvement in the country. However, Denmark decided to postpone a new phase of its cooperation 
in the water sector and to consider adjustments in the overall country programme (G. R. Olsen 
2011, 97). According to Olsen,  
The Swedish experience from holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2009 confirms 
the existence of the North–South divide within the Union when it comes to other policy issues 
linked to Africa. During the Swedish Presidency, a number of Francophone countries were on 
the agenda. France considered Mauritius, Guinea Conakry, Niger and Madagascar as its genuine 
interests; therefore, it was very difficult for the Presidency to find common ground among the 
member states for policy initiatives directed towards these four countries. Based on the 
                                                 
4 It is important to recognize that influence is a two-way street: ‘DfID is influenced, but also heavily influences what 
others do’ (journalist, 28 August 2014). 
experiences during the Presidency and other examples, Swedish decision-makers in general 
consider France as a difficult partner to work with in an African context (G. R. Olsen 2012, 
416). 
In sum, as argued by Chafer and Cumming, there is “a natural partnership between the UK and the 
Nordics … and a less fruitful alliance between France and the Scandinavian States” (Chafer and 
Cumming 2011, 10). Today British representatives feel much closer to their like-minded 
counterparts than French officials do. Both journalists and researchers have already suggested that, 
because of participation in the Nordic Plus Group, UK policies are therefore becoming 
‘increasingly’ similar to those of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway (The Economist 
2002; Knack 2013, 348).  
Importantly, close coordination between Nordic Plus donors sometimes takes place at the expenses 
of European coordination. As reported by Delputte and Orbie,  
Some Nordic Plus interviewees … suggested that more intense EU coordination conflicts with 
their identity, which corresponds more with ‘supporting the principle of multilateralism’ than 
‘being an EU donor’. This opinion also rests on a perception that through EU coordination, the 
EU Delegations aim to strengthen a common European identity rather than making EU aid more 
effective (Delputte and Orbie 2014, 11).  
Delputte and Söderbaum reported that, in Zambia and Tanzania, the Commission suffers from 
administrative delays and a burdensome hierarchy. Hence, it is the complete opposite of some 
Nordic Plus donors, who are considered as more flexible agencies: ‘by the time the Commission 
gives the green light, its ideas are already superseded by what we have already agreed in the 
sectors’ (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012, 43). 
 
Conclusion 
While past research has emphasized the significant role played by domestic politics to explain 
variation in the degree of internalization of political conditionality by EU Member States (de Felice 
2015), this article showed that the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than 
France also because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures within the Nordic Plus 
Group. 
The article contributes to the expanding literature on the Europeanization of development assistance 
in two important ways. To begin with, it is one of the few studies ever to explore convergence or 
divergence in the internalization of political conditionality by EU Member States. So far, research 
on the Europeanization of development cooperation neglected variation between countries, and 
focused on other aspects (such as aid quantity, regional focus, tied aid and use of budget support).  
Second, the article confirms the plausibility of international constructivist explanations for variation 
in Europeanization outcomes. In their attempt to explain why common European pressures often 
result in different impacts at the national level, Europeanisation researchers concentrated on 
domestic mediating factors, overlooking the potential role of international mediating factors. EU 
Member States participate in different international organisations and informal networks. The social 
pressures exerted within these groupings can significantly affect their willingness to comply with 
European ‘ways of doing things’. As shown in this article, Nordic donors often took the leadership 
in the application of aid sanctions, thus encouraging other EU donors (but not all of them) to follow 
their example. 
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